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Abstract.  
 
The present contribution examines the emergence of expected utility theory by John von Neumann 
and Oskar Morgenstern, the subjective the expected utility theory by Savage, and the problem of 
choice under risk and uncertainty, focusing in particular on the seminal work “The Utility Analysis 
of Choices involving Risk" (1948) by Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage to show how the 
evolution of the theory of choice has determined a separation of economics from psychology. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the first half of the 20th century, rational choice theory has become the core of neoclassical 
economics. In particular, the evolution of the theory of decision-making was marked by an “anti-
psychologist" movement. A new theoretical framework has been established by crystallizing, through 
analytical terms and mathematical constraints, the process of rational choice, stripping it of any 
psychological and descriptive content. Rationality was construed as consistency of preference or of 
choice, so that an individual is rational if he has coherent behaviors and consistent preferences. In 
other words, rational is the individual that is able to think clearly and to make decisions and judgments 
that are based on reason. Consequently, there is a clear separation between economics, which has 
become the center of the normative theories, (i.e. how the individual should act), and psychology 
which has become the field of study of actual behavior. Although discrepancies between normative 
prescriptions and behavior were well known, they were considered a minor problem. 
 
This paper examines the emergence of expected utility theory by John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern, the subjective the expected utility theory by Savage, and the problem of choice under 
risk and uncertainty, focusing in particular on the seminal work “The Utility Analysis of Choices 
involving Risk" (1948) by Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage to show how the evolution of the 
theory of choice has determined a separation of economics from psychology. 
 
2. Choice under risk and uncertainty 
 
The rational choice under risk and uncertainty was based on the notion of probability. In fact, 
probability theory was developed as a rational approach to risk and uncertainty, and the great 
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mathematicians that gave fundamental contributions to this theory in XVIII and XIX centuries 
implicitly assumed that their models should have allowed persons exposed to risky decisions to 
behave rationally. The efforts of mathematicians were only partially successful. In fact, despite these 
efforts, the progressive edification of the theory of probability did not remove some \irrationalities" 
in gambler's behavior. Still today there are some typical lotteries conditions in which gamblers exhibit 
systematic discrepancies from the normative prescriptions of the theory. 
 
The best-known phenomenon in this respect is now called “gambler's fallacy": it happens when the 
sequence of numbers extracted in repetitive runs of a lottery appears to gamblers not to be random1. 
This line of thinking is incorrect because past events do not change the probability that certain events 
will occur in the future. 
 
Let's analyze “gambler's fallacy" in more details. 
In a random sequence of tosses of a fair coin, for example, gamblers expect sequences where the 
proportion of heads and tails in any short segment stays far closer to .50 .50 than probability theory 
would predict. In other words, gamblers expect that also a short sequence of heads on the toss of a 
coin is balanced by a tendency for the opposite outcome (e.g., tails) and bet accordingly. 
But each toss of the coin is an independent event, which means that any previous toss of coin has no 
bearing on future toss. That some gamblers' beliefs about probability are systematically biased have 
become more and more evident in parallel with the progressive construction of the theory. Already 
in 1796, Pierre Simon de Laplace was concerned with errors of judgment that he gave the first 
published account of the gambler's fallacy. 
 
3. The expected utility theory 
 
The expected utility theory (EUT) is a special instance of the theory of choice under objective 
uncertainty, or risk. The theory's main concern is the representation of individual attitudes toward 
risk. Its basic premises are (Karni, 2014, p. 4):  
 
(a) because the outcomes, xi, are mutually exclusive, the evaluation of risky prospects entails 
separate evaluations of the outcomes; 
(b) these evaluations are quantifiable by a cardinal utility, u; 
c) the utilities of the alternative outcomes are aggregated by taking their expectations with 
respect to the objective probabilities, p1; … ; pn. 
 
EUT states that the decision maker chooses between risky and uncertain prospects by comparing their 
expected utility values, i.e. the weighted sum obtained by adding the utility values of outcomes 
multiplied by their respective probabilities. In EUT, the probabilities are a primitive concept 
representing the objective uncertainty. 
 
The expected-utility theory of behavior under risk, or, more precisely, the principle of maximizing 
expected monetary values had been first advanced by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738 as a resolution of the 
St. Petersburg Paradox. Bernoulli resolved the paradox by assuming a logarithmic utility function of 
                                                          
1 The gambler's fallacy is also known as Monte Carlo fallacy. 
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wealth, whose essential property was “diminishing marginal utility." So, Bernoulli (1954) had 
devised the notion of expected utility, wherein he decomposed the valuation of a risky venture as the 
sum of utilities from outcomes weighted by the probabilities of outcomes. 
 
In the St. Petersburg game people were asked how much they would pay for the following prospect: 
if tails come out of the first toss of a fair coin, to receive nothing and stop the game, and in the 
complementary case, to receive two guilders and stay in the game; 
if tails come out of the second toss of the coin, to receive nothing and stop the game, and in the 
complementary case, to receive four guilders and stay in the game; and so on ad infinitum. 
The expected monetary value of this prospect is 
 
∑
1
2𝑛
∝
𝑛=1    (2
n) = + ∞ 
 
Since the people always set a definite, possibly quite small upper value on the St. Petersburg prospect, 
it follows that they do not price it in terms of its expected monetary value. Bernoulli argued in effect 
that they estimate it in terms of the utility of money outcomes, and defended the Log function as a 
plausible idealization, given its property of quickly decreasing marginal utilities. 
Because the resulting series, 
 
∑
1
2𝑛
∝
𝑛=1    (Log2
n), 
 
is convergent, Bernoulli's hypothesis is supposed to deliver a solution to the paradox. Thus, 
Bernoulli's hypothesis counts as the first systematic occurrence of expected utility theory (Mongin, 
1997). 
 
However, Bernoulli’s assumption of diminishing marginal utility seemed to imply that, in a gamble, 
a gain would increase utility less than a decline would reduce it. Consequently, many scholars 
(economists, statisticians) concluded, the willingness to take on risk must be “irrational”, and thus 
the issue of choice under risk or uncertainty was viewed suspiciously, or at least considered to be 
outside the realm of an economic theory which assumed rational actors. 
 
3.1 Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory of expected utility under risk 
 
The great task of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern was to lay a rational foundation for 
decision-making under risk according to expected utility rules. Thus, the theory of expected utility 
under risk received its first axiomatic characterization in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of 
games and economic behavior (1947, 2nd edition)2. In particular, von Neumann and Morgenstern 
state a series of axioms about the individual’s preferences over indifference classes of lotteries, and 
offer a proof that an individual obeying these axioms will then follow expected utility theory.  
Consequently, the preference structure is depicted by a set of axioms. In the normative interpretation, 
                                                          
2 It is important to observe that von Neumann and Morgenstern developed a utility theory intended to serve as auxiliary 
to their main goal: a theory of games, which they planned to make the most adequate description of economic activity in 
general (Mengov, 2015). 
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these axioms are regarded as tenets of rational choice and should be judged by their normative appeal. 
In fact, if an individual does not maximize his expected utility he violates in his choice some precise 
axiomatic principles, which are rationally binding (Schilirò, 2013). Actually, von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's expected utility theory has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational 
choice. 
In different terms, von Neumann and Morgenstern analyzed the strategic behavior of players in 
noncooperative zero-sum games in which no pure strategy equilibrium exists. In such games, the 
equilibrium may require the employment of mixed strategy. By adopting the axiomatic approach to 
depict the decision maker's preference relation on the set of objective risks, von Neumann and 
Morgenstern identified necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a utility function on a 
set of outcomes that captures the decision maker's risk attitudes, and represented his/her choice as 
expected utility maximizing behavior (Karni, 2014). 
Let's analyze in more analytical details the EUT. 
The expected utility theory under risk is concerned with the evaluation of risky prospects, depicted 
as lotteries over an arbitrary set of outcomes (or prizes). 
 
Let                            
                                                           X = {𝑥1; … ; 𝑥𝑛} 
 
be the set of outcomes and denote a risky prospect by 
 
                                                         (xi; pi; …, xn; pn); 
 
where for each i, pi indicates the probability of the outcomes xi. In the model of expected utility 
theory under risk, risky prospects are evaluated according to the following functional form: 
 
                                                           ∑ 𝑢(𝑥𝑖)𝑝𝑖;𝑛𝑖=1  
 
where u is the real-valued function on X representing the decision maker's tastes. 
 
In other words, i are the states of the world. In each state of the world, i, the individual receives xi 
(euros/dollars). The probability of receiving xi is pi. An individual will prefer a risky lottery over 
another if their utility is higher in the first lottery compared to the second. It is important to note that 
in their theoretical framework, Von Neumann and Morgenstern provide a method to measure 
cardinally the marginal utility of money. But this method does not refer whether the marginal utility 
of money diminishes or increases. 
This EUT states that the decisions of economic agents conform to an expected utility function of the 
outcomes3. In practice, individuals should always choose in risky situations the alternatives that offer 
them the highest utility, i.e. the alternatives that offer ever higher earnings or the lowest losses. The 
theory is built with the minimum set of reasonable assumptions (axioms). The main axioms of EUT 
                                                          
3 The expected utility model derives its name from the fact the preference function V (∙) consists of the mathematical 
expectation of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(∙), with respect to the probability distribution P. Of 
course, there is a variety of attitudes toward risk depending upon the shape of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function U(∙). 
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according to von Neumann and Morgenstern are: completeness; transitivity; continuity of 
preferences4. The set of axioms provides criteria for the rationality of choices. What do these axioms 
of expected utility mean? First, all individuals are assumed to make completely rational decisions 
(reasonable). Second, people are assumed to make these rational decisions among thousands of 
alternatives. Finally, uncertainty or risk does not possess utility or disutility on its own. 
 
The great task of von Neumann and Morgenstern was to lay a rational foundation for decision-making 
under risk according to expected utility rules. An important positive aspect of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's contribution is that, through the axioms of the expected utility theory, the underlying 
logic of the decision-making behavior is greatly simplified. Though the novelty of using the axiomatic 
method caused that most economists of the time would find their contribution inaccessible. However, 
restatements and re-axiomatizations by Jacob Marschak (1950) and Paul Samuelson (1952)5did much 
to make the theory more accessible. At the same time, a growing number of instances emerged that 
clearly showed how the theory was unable to explain real economic behavior. But, in any case, it 
remains a cornerstone in the development of theory of choice and, more generally, of science. 
 
3.2 Savage Subjective Expected Utility theory 
 
Years after the contribution of von Neumann and Morgenstern, Leonard Savage in The Foundations 
of Statistics (1954) proposed the first complete axiomatic subjective expected utility theory, focusing 
on uncertainty rather than risk. Subjective expected utility theory is another relevant instance of the 
theory of choice under uncertainty, while the expected utility hypothesis was originally formulated 
to be used with specified or objective probabilities. 
Savage introduced his new analytical framework, which was a synthesis of the ideas of de Finetti 
(1937)6 and von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). He provided necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the existence and joint uniqueness of utility and probability, as well as the characterization of 
individual choice in the face of uncertainty as expected utility maximizing behavior (Karni, 2014).  
In Savage's approach the notion of probability does not appear as a primitive concept in his model. 
One important goal of Savage's theory, with regard to probability, was to furnish the prior probability, 
that constituted the missing ingredient necessary to complete Bayes' model7. 
 
The model of subjective expected utility by Savage (1954) postulates a preference structure that 
permits (Karni, 2014, p.11): 
 
                                                          
4 Von Neumann and Morgenstern do not feature an assumption corresponding to what today we call the `Independence 
Axiom' (Moscati, 2016). 
5 Samuelson not only gave a major contribution to re-axiomatizations of the von Neumann and Morgenstern's theoretical 
approach, but he also became a supporter of the expected utility hypothesis (Moscati, 2016). 
6 de Finetti devised the same notion of probability already suggested by Ramsey (1926). The basic idea behind the 
Ramsey-de Finetti derivation is that by observing the bets people make, one can presume this reflects their personal beliefs 
on the outcome of the race. Thus, Ramsey and de Finetti argued that subjective probabilities can be inferred from 
observation of people's actions. de Finetti's model, in particular, was based on the notion of expected value maximizing 
behavior, or linear utility. 
7 Bayes outlined a method, since known as Bayes' rule, for updating probabilities in light of new information. Bayes' 
method does not specify how the original, or prior, probabilities to be updated are determined (Karni, 2014). 
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(i) the numerical expression of the decision maker's valuation of the consequences by a utility 
function; 
(ii) the numerical expression of the decision maker's degree of beliefs in the likelihoods of events by 
a finitely additive, probability measure; 
(iii) the evaluation of acts by the mathematical expectations of the utility of their consequences with 
respect to the subjective probabilities of the events in which these consequences materialize. In this 
model, the utility of the consequences is independent of the underlying events, and the probabilities 
of events are independent of the consequences assigned to these events by the acts. 
 
In analytical terms, Savage proved that, if the decision-maker adheres to axioms of rationality, 
believing an uncertain event has possible outcomes xi, each with a utility of u(xi), the choices of the 
individual can be explained by this utility function combined with the subjective belief that there is a 
probability of each outcome, P(xi). Therefore, the subjective expected utility is the resulting expected 
value of the utility. 
           
∑ 𝑢𝑥𝑖  𝑃(𝑥𝑖)𝑖 . 
 
However, the descriptive validity of Savage's model, in particular, the specific functional form of the 
representation and the separability and linearity in the probabilities, has been questioned. 
The most severe criticism in this regard is due to Ellsberg (1961), who demonstrated, by using simple 
thought experiments, that individuals display choice patterns that are inconsistent with the existence 
of beliefs representable by a probability measure. 
 
 
4. The Contribution by Friedman and Savage 
 
The properties of the expected utility hypothesis when payoffs are univariate (i.e. money) were further 
developed in the post-war period. In 1948, Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage published in the 
Journal of Political Economy a seminal article ‘The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risks’, 
wherein they developed their own utility function (known as the Friedman-Savage utility function). 
In this article, the authors attempt “to provide a crude empirical test by bringing together a few broad 
observations about the behavior of individual in choosing among alternatives involving risk and 
investigating whether these observations are consistent with the hypothesis revived by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern. It turns out that these empirical observations are entirely consistent with the 
hypothesis if a rather special shape is given to total utility curve of money" (Friedman and Savage, 
1948, p. 282). 
Friedman and Savage start from the question: why do people buy both lottery tickets and insurance 
against losses? It is well known that when a person gets an insurance policy, he pays to escape or 
avoid risk.  
 
“An individual who buy fire insurance on a house he owns is accepting the certain loss of a small 
sum (the insurance premium) in preference to the combination of a small chance of a much larger 
loss (the value of the house) and a large chance of no loss. That is, he is choosing certainty in 
preference of uncertainty" (Friedman and Savage, 1948, p. 279). 
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But when it buys a lottery ticket, he gets a small chance of a large gain, whereas is subjecting himself 
to a large chance of losing a small amount. Thus, he assumes risk. So that he is choosing uncertainty 
in preference to certainty8. In addition, the empirical evidence for the willingness of persons of all 
income classes to buy insurance or lottery tickets is extensive. 
Friedman and Savage remind us that this choice among different degree of risk so prominent in 
insurance and gambling is also very important and present in a much broader range of economic 
choices (e.g. in labor market, financial markets, business activities, etc.). But, according to Friedman 
and Savage, although economic theorists (e.g. Marshall, Edgeworth, Fisher, Pareto) explained the 
choices among riskless alternatives in terms of maximization of utility, on the other hand they rejected 
the utility maximization as an explanation of choices among different degrees of risk. 
Friedman and Savage, instead, basing their analysis on von Neumann and Morgenstern's book Theory 
of Games and Economic Behavior (1947, 2nd edition), do not reject the utility maximization as an 
explanation of choices among different degrees of risk. In fact, von Neumann and Morgenstern 
challenged the rejection of maximization of expected utility and showed the conditions under which 
the expected value of utility is maximized in choosing among alternatives involving risk. However, 
the axiomatization of expected utility theory that Friedman and Savage (1948, pp. 287-288) have 
advanced consisted of three assumptions, which are not logically equivalent to von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's axioms, as questioned by Paul Samuelson in his “Japanese paper" of 1950 (Moscati, 
2016). 
 
But apart from the axiomatization of the expected utility hypothesis, Friedman and Savage theorized 
that individuals who both gamble and buy insurance may exhibit utility functions with both concave 
and convex segments. Then, Friedman and Savage consider and illustrate a utility function consistent 
with willingness of a low-income consumer unit both to purchase insurance and to gamble (ibid., p. 
285). 
 
Following their arguments in more details, these authors maintain that a single individual could have 
different utility functions depending on their initial wealth. The implication of an individual being, at 
the same time, risk-loving and averse, determines that its utility function has different curvatures, 
based upon the amount of wealth the individual has, in fact part of the utility function is concave, and 
part is convex, as shown in the Figure 1. This figure is consistent with the five statements by Friedman 
and Savage describing the features of the observable behavior concerning individual. The five 
statements are the following (ibid., p. 294): 
 
1. Consumer units prefer larger to smaller certain incomes; 
2. low-income consumer units buy, or are willing to buy, insurance; 
3. low-income consumer units buy, or are willing to buy, lottery tickets; 
4. many low-income consumer units buy, or are willing to buy, both insurance and lottery 
tickets; 
5. lotteries typically have more than one prizes. 
 
                                                          
8 The extensive market for highly speculative stocks is a border-line case that could equally well be designated as 
investment or gambling (Friedman and Savage, 1948, p. 285). 
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The reason why these particular statements are selected, according to Friedman and Savage, is that 
they are convenient to handle and the restrictions imposed to rationalize them turn out to be sufficient 
to rationalize all the behavior described by them in their article (ibid., pp. 283-287). 
 
Let's focus on Figure 1, where W represents the wealth of the individual and U is the total utility 
function. 
Across the lower range the individual wishes to play it safe, but above a certain margin he is willing 
to take gambles. In the first part the utility function (U0 Ua) is concave to the origin, so the individual 
exhibits risk aversion and is inclined to buy insurance against potential losses; in the second part (Ua, 
Uc) the function is convex to the origin, so the individual becomes risk loving. In the third part (above 
Uc), the curve would become concave again at a suitably high level of wealth
9. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
The conclusions by Friedman and Savage (1948, p. 303) regarding the behavior of consumer units in 
choosing among alternatives involving risk are that an individual behaves as if  
 
1. it had a consistent set of preferences; 
2. it chose among the alternatives involving risk that one for which the expected utility (as contrasted 
with the utility of the expected income) is largest; 
3. the function describing the utility of money income had in general the following properties: 
a) utility rises with income, i.e. marginal utility of money income everywhere positive; 
b) it is convex from above below some income (i.e. diminishing marginal utility of money income 
for incomes below some income), concave between that income and some larger income (i.e. 
increasing marginal utility of money for incomes between that income and some larger income), 
and convex for all higher incomes (i.e. diminishing marginal utility of money income for all higher 
incomes); 
4. most consumer units tend to have incomes that place them in the segments of the utility function 
for which marginal utility of money income diminishes. 
 
Friedman and Savage underline that point 2 is an ancient idea revived10 and given new content by 
von Neumann and Morgenstern, while points 3b and 4 are the consequence of the attempt of their 
                                                          
9 Fig. 1 is equivalent to Fig.3 showed in Friedman and Savage (1948, p.297). 
10 Friedman and Savage (1948, p. 281) recall Bernoulli’s analysis of the St. Petersbourg paradox. 
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paper to use this idea (in point 2) to rationalize existing knowledge about the choices people make 
among alternatives involving risk. 
 
An important feature of this version of expected utility theory provided by Friedman and Savage is 
that it has been considered by the authors as a descriptive model of economic behavior, not just a 
normative model. In fact, in the subsection of the article where Friedman and Savage (1948) (pp. 297-
298) discuss the descriptive realism of the hypothesis, they maintain that the validity of their 
hypothesis depends solely on whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions about the class of 
decisions with which the hypothesis deals. The reasoning relative to the approach “as if”, used in the 
Friedman and Savage’s article, will become the “as if” methodology in Friedman’s famous essay 
‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’ (1953). 
 
Later, Harry Markovitz (1952) criticized the Friedman-Savage utility function. In fact, he proposed a 
utility function that explains gambling and insurance which differs significantly from Friedman and 
Savage’s (1948) utility function. Markowitz argued that the final concavity of their function assumes 
that individuals with the highest incomes would never gamble. He raised a few important issues, later 
on confirmed by experimental studies. First, Markowitz proposed measuring utility based on a 
reference level instead of in absolute values. This implied that, to individuals, small gains would 
provide an increasing utility, while big gains would provide a decreasing utility, anticipating 
somehow Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory (1979)11. So, he claimed that not only total 
wealth but also change of wealth may be a factor in the decision-making process, and second, that 
“temporary” changes in the utility function might take place and, therefore, a distinction should be 
made between “customary” wealth and present wealth. Moreover, he also suggested that the inflection 
point temporarily “travels” along the utility function (Levy and Wiener (2013)). 
Thus, the Markowitz’s utility function is the following as represented in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
The contribution of Markovitz (1952), according to Rabin and Thaler (2001) (p.223) “provides 
simple, clear, and decisive illustrations of how the combined convex/concave functions lead to a host 
of patently false predictions”. 
                                                          
11 For a discussion on prospect theory, Schilirò (2016). 
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However, in 1952 Friedman and Savage published another article ‘The Expected-Utility Hypothesis 
and the Measurability of Utility’, wherein they constructed an expected utility curve which, they 
claimed, provided a reasonably accurate representation of human behavior at the aggregate level.  
In this article, Friedman and Savage consider the individual’s expression of preferences as irrelevant 
and, consequently, not to be submitted to empirical control. Deviations from rational decision making 
were supposed to be detectable only at the aggregate level, and many attempts were made to justify 
the persuasion that, on average, individuals behave rationally. 
 
Friedman, in particular, suggested an evolutionary defense of full rationality by claiming that those 
who failed to conform to rational behavior would be gradually excluded by market selection. 
A fortiori, according to this view, the psychological aspects of decision making were not considered 
worthy of investigation, because non-rational behaviors were thought to be a minor aspect of market 
economies. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined the expected utility theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) (2nd 
edition), the subjective the expected utility theory by Savage (1954), and the problem of choice under 
risk and uncertainty, focusing in particular on the seminal work ‘The Utility Analysis of Choices 
involving Risk’ (1948) by Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage. The major goal of the paper has 
been to show that the evolution of the theory of choice was marked by an “anti-psychologist” 
approach, thus creating a situation of separation of economics from psychology. 
 
For several decades, the expected utility theory has been the paradigmatic model of decision-making 
under risk and uncertainty. The expected utility model acquired its dominant position because it is 
founded on normatively compelling principles, and its representation has an appealing functional 
form (Karni (2014)). However, although the expected utility theory has had great success, since it 
makes the mathematical modeling of the decision-making process very simple, it neglects some 
important variables involved in the decision process such as the complexity of the task, the limits of 
the cognitive resources of the agents, etc. (Schilirò (2012)). 
 
The contributions by Friedman and Savage (1948, 1952), even more so, have placed economics in an 
autonomous position with respect to psychology; the former being stripped of any psychological 
elements. However, Maurice Allais (1953), shortly after, will undermine this theoretical position with 
his epistemology of exact descriptions and the related falsifications of rational choice theory 
(Schilirò (2012, 2013)). 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments: I wish to thank Mario Graziano for the helpful discussions and suggestions. The 
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